1 Those consumers who do not receive an advertisement conjecture that the price is likely to be high. Thus, uninformed consumers with low reservation prices are not willing to sink the costs to find out the actual price, since they expect that with a high probability they will not purchase and the visiting cost will be wasted.
2The type of coupon I have in mind is the one with the price printed on it. If the coupon is of the "cents off" variety then there is no price commitment and the monopolist may face a time inconsistency problem. In fact, in this model the monopolist is only willing to send out coupons with price commitment. C Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996
II. REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE
My model brings together two separate strands of the literature, one dealing with price advertising3 and the other with coupons and rebates. I discuss each in turn.
A monopolist's optimal pricing and advertising policies have been studied by Bester [1994] . In Bester's model there is no exogenous uncertainty, and price advertising arises to solve a time inconsistency problem. Given that consumers incur a cost s to visit the store, their reservation prices at home and at the store are different and, as a result, a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist. If consumers expect a price po, only those with reservation prices greater than or equal to po + s will choose to visit the store. Given such a kinked demand function, the optimal firm's price ispo + s, which is inconsistent with consumers' expectations. Thus equilibrium must involve the use of mixed strategies. In Bester's model, advertising is essentially a commitment device although advertisements actually provide valuable information to consumers, because of the strategic uncertainty.4
LeBlanc [1993] introduces exogenous uncertainty in an oligopoly model in which firms' costs are private information. In the first stage, before uncertainty resolves, firms may costlessly announce an ex-ante pricing rule p(c). In the second stage, after observing their actual costs, firms may still engage in costly price advertising.5 This model nicely illustrates how advertising enhances price competition. However, by allowing firms to precommit to a price rule, the time inconsistency problem is ruled out.
My model embeds the time consistency problem into a model involving exogenous uncertainty. The combination of both issues produces the scope for rigid prices to emerge as optimal behavior. Coupons emerge as a better alternative than changing prices to accommodate needs of flexibility.
The literature has considered two types of coupons. The first type are coupons associated with repeat purchases. If a consumer buys one unit of the good from a particular seller, a discount is automatically received on future purchases from the same seller. Banerjee and Summers [1987] and Caminal and Matutes [1990] show that firns find it profitable to introduce such coupons in order to create artificial switching costs. In equilibrium, firms' profits are increased but social welfare is reduced.
The second type of coupons are the ones usually distributed in newspapers, magazines or by mail. These coupons have been rationalized as a price discriminating device. If coupons can be targeted to specific consumer groups, 3The early literature on informative advertising (for instance, Butters [1977] , Grossman and Shapiro [1984] and Stegeman [1990] focused on the case in which advertisements convey information on both the existence of the product and the price quoted. Thus, consumers choose among the firms from whom they have received an advertisement. In this case, the advertising intensity is always strictly positive.
4This model is extended to the oligopoly case by Bester and Petrakis [1995] , who show that there may be multiple mixed strategy equilibria. See also Lal and Matutes [1994] for an analysis of price and advertising decisions in a multiproduct duopoly. 5In his model the advertising decision is discrete: the firm either does not advertise or informs the entire market. the optimal pricing policy consists of setting a high regular price and sending out coupons to those consumers with relatively low reservation prices (see, for instance, Bester and Petrakis [1994] . If couponing is untargeted, it still may be the case that consumers with high reservation prices face higher costs of using coupons (measured, fot example, by the value of time spent collecting and organizing the coupons). In this case, consumers self-select and only those with low reservation prices end up using the coupons and purchasing at discount prices (See Narasimhan [1984] ; and Gertsner, Hess and Holthausen [1994] .
In this paper, I consider the second type of coupons. Couponing is thus a price discriminating device even though it is untargeted and all consumers who receive the coupon use it if they purchase the product. Thus, price discrimination is only a by-product of costly information transmission and of the endogenous segmentation between informed and uninformed consumers.
III. A MONOPOLY MODEL WITH PRICE ADVERTISING
Consider a monopolist that produces a homogeneous good with unit production cost c, which is a random variable distributed over the interval [, c] according to the probability density function h(c), h(c) > 0 for all c in its support. There is a continuum of risk-neutral consumers indexed by i. Each consumer chooses to purchase either one unit of the good or zero and has a willingness to pay denoted by Ri. Consumers' reservation prices are uniformly distributed between 0 and a with density 1. Also, each consumer has to pay a cost s to visit the firm.6 Thus, if we denote by p the price charged by the monopolist, consumer i's payoff from shopping is equal to Ri -s -p.
A crucial assumption is that consumers can only learn the price either by receiving a message sent by the firm (advertisement) or by visiting the firm and paying s. Price advertising is costly for the firm. To inform a proportion ,u of consumers the firm must pay P(u). Advertising cannot be targeted to a specific consumer group, i.e. the probability that consumer i receives a message is p, independently of Ri. As is standard, I assume that price advertising involves full commnitment, i.e. a firm can not charge a price different from the one advertised. Reputation arguments and legal sanctions are often invoked to justify this assumption.
The timing of the game is the following. At the beginning of the period the monopolist privately observes the realization of c, sets the pricep and chooses the intensity of advertising ,u. Thus, a strategy for the firm is a pair [p(c), j(c)]. Informed consumers, those who received the message, choose to visit the firm provided Ri -s -p > 0. Uninformed consumers, those who did not receive any message, update their beliefs about the distribution of prices and decide whether to visit the firm or not. Once in the firm they learn the actual price and purchase the good provided p < Ri. and on the probability distribution of c, they decide whether to visit the firm or not. Unsophisticated consumers may simply use the ex-ante probability density function h(c) to compute the expected value of visiting the firm. However, rational consumers can potentially infer useful information about the distribution of prices from the fact that they did not receive a message. For instance, suppose consumers expect that the intensity of advertising is higher for relatively low realizations of c. In this case, consumers interpret not having received a message as an indication that a high realization of c is in fact more likely than initially expected. More formally, the consumers' probability density function of c, conditional on not having received any message, denoted by )e(c), can be computed by using Bayes' rule: If the firn informs a proportion ,u of potential consumers that the price is p, then it attracts ,u(a -s -p) of these informed consumers. Uninformed consumers decide to purchase the good if and only if Ri > p. Hence, if p > Ro the demand of uninformed consumers is (1 -j)(a -p) and if p < Ro, the demand is (1 -t)(a -Ro).
The shape of the advertising cost function is important not so much in terms of the qualitative properties of the equilibrium but to make sure that a pure strategy equilibrium exists (and is unique). The assumptions below are sufficient, but clearly not necessary, conditions for existence. I assume throughout the paper that These assumptions imply decreasing returns to scale in advertising.7 In particular, informing the first consumer is arbitrarily cheap (P'(0) = 0), but informing the entire market is prohibitive (lim F P(y) = ox). The assumption of zero marginal advertising costs at ,u=0 makes low scale advertising very attractive; nevertheless economic considerations will rule this possibility out. By assuming very high marginal advertising costs for p close to 1 we make sure that, for some realizations of c, informed and uninformed consumers coexist in equilibrium, which is crucial to show existence of equilibria. It is also assumed that the third derivative is not too negative. This is a technical condition that implies well behaved pricing and advertising policies. The proofs are given in the Appendix and the graphical representation is provided in Figure 1 . The intuition goes as follows. Consider the firn's optimization problem for a given Ro. That is, given that all uninformed consumers with Ri > Ro visit the firm and purchase the good as long as Ri > p. Thus, in the absence of advertising the monopolist faces a kinked demand function, with demand equal to (a -p) for prices above Ro, and (a -Ro) for prices below Ro. If c is high enough so that the full information monopoly price is above Ro -s, i.e. if a + c -s/2 > Ro -s, then the monopolist does not advertise and sets the optimal price given the demand function of the uninformed, a + c/2. The reason is twofold; first, advertising is costly; and second, it reduces total sales since informed consumers only visit the firm is Ri > p + s.
T(u) is three times continuously differentiable, with T(O) = T'(O)=O
If (a + c -s/2) < Ro -s, it could be optimal to advertise below Ro, provided the intensity of advertising is high. Advertising a price below Ro -s to a small fraction of consumers (even if its cost is negligible) can never be optimal because few additional consumers are attracted while the price is also reduced to all uninformed consumers. Also, advertising with high intensity can only be profitable if the full information monopoly price is substantially below Ro, and the gains from setting a lower price make up for the advertising costs.
In other words, the firm faces a kinked demand function, with the absolute value of the slope of the demand curve at prices below Ro being inversely related to the intensity of advertising. Thus, the discontinuity in the price function can be explained by the standard arguments. What is special in this model is that both the kink and the slope of the demand function are endogenous and closely related to the costs of advertising.
According to Proposition 1, existence of pure strategy equilibria is guaranteed if s is small enough.8 In Bester [1994] a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist because the cost of visiting the firm is relatively large with respect to the uncertainty on the firn's profit function (which is zero). Conversely, in our model existence requires the visiting cost to be relatively small with respect to the 8If the advertising cost function is linear up to a certain intensity u*, and infinite from thereafter, the sufficient condition for existence of pure strategy equilibria involves s < s*, where s* can be explicitly computed and it is a decreasing function of the marginal advertising cost.
(3 Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996 uncertainty on the firn's payoff function.9 The role of some of the assumptions on the advertising cost function can be now better understood. I have assumed that the limit of T(ju), as ,u goes to 1, is infinite (informing all the consumers is impossible). In the absence of such a condition, it could be the case that the firm chooses either i = 0 or i = 1 (as it would happen if the advertising cost function were not too convex in all the range). In this case, for c < CA, A(c) = 0 and the left hand side of equation (3) is always 0, and hence a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist.
Allowing for an arbitrarily low marginal advertising cost at low advertising levels was important to show that the discontinuities in the equilibrium price and advertising functions are essentially due to the firm's inability to price discriminate between informed and uninformed consumers and are not implied by the advertising technology. Finally, the condition on the third derivative implies that the firm's optimization problem has a unique local maximum.
III(i) Comparative statics and welfare
Let us first consider the limiting equilibrium as s goes to zero. In this case, the "downward rigidity" is more transparent since the price function becomes an inverse L (see Figure 2) the average price clearly increases. If s is strictly positive the price function is not independent of the distribution of shocks and moreover is not convex everywhere. However, if s is small enough the previous effect dominates.10 Changes in advertising costs have complicated effects on equilibrium payoffs. Clearly, as advertising costs go to zero, the equilibrium approaches the full information case. If s is arbitrary small, a reduction in advertising costs decreases Ro.11 As a result, both firm's profits and consumer surplus increase.
Since advertising costs are fully paid by the firm it is immediate that in equilibrium the level of advertising is inefficiently low. In other words, the monopolist does not internalize the increase in consumer surplus brought about by any additional advertisement. The implication of such a remark is that in this model a government subsidy on advertising expenses would increase social welfare. However, this result relies heavily on the absence of competition. In a competitive fiamework advertising also aims at stealing other firms' customers, which is (at least partially) a social loss. In general there are two countervailing 10 The fact that the average price increases with the dispersion of shocks does not imply that average welfare decreases, since welfare is not a concave function of the price. " This is not necessarily the case if s is relatively large. The reason is that if Ro falls the intensity of advertising for c below cA may actually decrease, and as a result prices in this range may increase. In fact, if this is not the case, the increase in advertising intensities implies an increase in CA, which again make the impact of advertising costs on the average price level potentially non-monotonic. effects: (i) a market size effect (advertising makes some mutually beneficial trade possible), which has a positive impact on social welfare, and (ii) a business stealing effect, which tends to have a negative impact on social welfare. Thus, equilibrium could be characterized by excessive advertising and in this case the opfimal policy would be to tax advertising.12
IV COUPONS AS A PRICE DISCRIMINATING DEVICE
The discontinuity in the equilibrium price function found in the previous section was due to the fact that for some realizations of the marginal cost the firm did not find it profitable to advertise a price reduction to a small fraction of consumers because this would have implied losses from the uninformed consumers. However, the monopolist could increase its profits if it were able to price discriminate between inforned and uninformed consumers.
By sending out coupons the firm can let some consumers know that it is willing to sell the good at reduced prices but at the same time does not have to cut the price charged to uninformed consumers. In this section we analyze this issue by adding to the model of the previous section the possibility of sending out coupons.
The finn, after learning the realization of c, can inform a fraction p of the population of its regular price p by paying a cost P(u). Also, it can send out coupons to a fraction ( of the population by paying a cost 0Q(b). Each coupon allows the receiver to purchase the good at a price q. This is equivalent to saying that the coupon could announce the regular price p and allow for a discount d, in which case the actual price would be q =p -d.
I assume that regular price advertising and sending out coupons are independent activities; i.e. given the firm's choice (c, p), the probability that a particular individual receives a message about the regular price is i (independent of 6) and the probability that receives a coupon is 6 (independent of p). It would make sense to assume that Q(z) > T(z) for all z > 0. The reason is that coupons are simply a more specialized type of advertising, since each message reaches exclusively a single individual. Thus, the firm can announce the regular price simply by using the coupon sending technology but also can use alternative technologies (radio, TV, etc. which have a public good characteristic). Thus, sending out cou4pons to a certain fraction of the population must be at least as costly as informing them of the regular price. However, it turns out that, given the assumptions made above, the relative inefficiency of the coupons sending technology does not matter for existence. The firm's equilibrium strategy is depicted in Figure 3 . Likewise in the previous section the discontinuities survive as we take the limit of s going to zero. Also in the limit CA goes to c, and CB goes to 2Ro -a (provided 2Ro -a < c).
In this case, a strategy for the firm is a vector [p(c), q(c)
Since coupons allow the firm to price discriminate between informed and uninformed consumers, if c is below but close to (2Ro -a) the firn does not find it optimal to set a regular price below Ro, but it can increase its profits by sending In this paper I analyze the interaction between a firm and a large number of consumers in a world in which the transmission of price information from sellers to buyers is a costly activity. The firm may advertise its price but alternatively consumers may find out the price by visiting the firm and hence paying a small cost. In equilibrium the price exhibits downward rigidity, in the sense that it rarely falls below the "normal" level and when it does so it falls discretely, and the firm advertises such an unusual low price with high intensity.
The model clearly indicates that such a price rigidity arises from the fact that the firm is required to charge the same price to those consumers who received the advertisement and those who did not. In this context coupons can be an efficient mechanism to price discriminate between informed and uninformed consumers. If we keep consumers' conjectures unchanged, allowing for coupons reduces the degree of price rigidity and increases profits as well as social welfare. However, the comparison across equilibrium types (with and without coupons) is much more problematic.
Two extensions of this model seem to be particularly promising. First, by considering strategic firm interaction we would be able to understand how firms' incentives to advertise their pricing policies (and thus the degree of downward price rigidity) change with the degree of competition. Second, by making the model dynamic we may be able to provide an interesting theory of endogenous price adjustment costs. 
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